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Simone Santini
Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
Abstract
This paper is a theoretical analysis of formal annotation
and ontology for the expression of the semantics of docu-
ment. They are found wanting in this respect, not only for
technical reasons, but because they embody a fundamen-
tally misunderstood model of the process of signification.
I propose an alternative model in which the interpretation
context plays a fundamental roˆle, and briefly discuss it and
its current technical embodiment.
1 Introduction
This is a position paper on meaning, on the process of
signification, of its importance for data processing prob-
lems, and on the (in my view) misguided ways in which the
problem has been heretofore regarded within the computing
community. Quite a lot of stuff to fit into a conference com-
munication. I called the paper “oddly-positioned” in part, I
admit it, for the divertissement of the word play in the title
but, a bit more substantially, because the position that I am
defending here is not terribly popular. Computing scientists
and professionals are oriented towards a rather specific way
of considering meaning and, especially under the pressure
of lavishly funded eforts such as the “semantic web”, one
has the impression that views that dare to question the re-
ceived wisdom are not entirely welcome. I do, of course,
hope of being mistaken because, as it happens, I regard the
common way of considering semantics a rather naı¨ve one,
one that ignores what we have come to know in the last cen-
tury about semantics.
Some people might find my arguments a bit on the philo-
sophical side, but I shall offer no apologies for that. Seman-
tics is essentially a philosophical issue. The computer sci-
entist who design programs for particle physics can’t help
but coming in touch with a bit of quantum physics, because
that is what particle physics is about. Analogously, com-
puting scientists who want to work on semantics can’t help
but deal with (as Sam Spade would have put it) the stuff
semantics is made of: philosophy.
2 Ontology for the representation of seman-
tics
One solution to the problem of semantic data processing,
quite popular in the computing milieu these days, entails
the formal annotation of the semantically problematic data.
Annotating the data with a formal language serves, in this
vision, two purposes. On the one hand, it is supposed to rep-
resent a “semantic” annotation: an annotation that records
the pure meaning of the data, distilling it from the super-
structures and the uncertainties of natural language. On the
other hand, being formal, the language of the annotation al-
lows one to make the same semantic assumptions that one
does in standard data bases, namely that semantics can be
formalized using method similar to the formal semantics
of programming languages. This semantic programme is
based on the assumption that the semantic problems that we
face vis a` vis our data are not due to an inherent characteris-
tic of the data themselves, but to the defective way in which
the meaning of the data is carried by the language in which
they are expressed. It is assumed that, at the core, web data
are not that different from the ones in data bases, in that they
do have an inherent meaning that can be made sense of by
an algorithm. The problem is that these data are expressed
in semiotic systems (from natural language to images and
video) that make it difficult to extract this meaning. (The
word “extract” does a lot of work here, since it underlies
one foundational assumption of this approach, namely that
meaning is an inherent quality of the data.) It is assumed,
however, that meaning pre-exists the text (logically, not nec-
essarily chronologically), that can be expressed in a suitable
formal system and attached to the text in a form that can be
understood by an algorithm.
The “hubs” of systems organized along these lines are
the so-called ontologies, collections of axioms that suppos-
edly capture the semantics of the terms used in a certain
text and make the text amenable to treatment using standard
data base techniques. The most diffused and celebrated (and
lavishly funded) form of this approach can be found in the
so-called semantic web.
Is ontology a viable way of representing meaning? Let
us begin by noting that, by posing the problem in these
terms we are already begging the question of whether mean-
ing can be represented at all, that is, if it can be reified as a
property of a document. Ontology says that it can, and that
it can be represented as a collection of axioms on terms and
relations. Since relations and their axioms are an important
part of any ontology, one obvious way to start our analysis
is to ask is whether they are constitutive of meaning or not,
that is, once we have represented a text by referring its el-
ements to an ontology, whether the meaning resides in the
terms themselves or in the relations. We shall see that none
of the two alternative is ultimately satisfactory.
Let us consider the first option first. This point of view is
expressed quite well in Jerry Fodor’s informational seman-
tics:
Informational semantics denies that “dog” means
dog because of the way it is related to other lin-
guistic expressions [...]. Correspondingly, infor-
mational semantics denies that the concept DOG
has its content in virtue of its position in a net-
work of conceptual relations
The “correspondingly” here does a lot of work, and re-
quires a fairly important metaphysical investment since it
maps conceptual structures to linguistic ones. This, passim,
is the same investment that ontology requires when it takes
a linguistic structure (composed of words and relations) and
calls it a conceptual model.
One of the problems of this point of view is that if you
hold it as a theory of meaning is very hard to get out of
radical nativism. That is, this model leads you almost auto-
matically to admit that all concepts are innate, and almost
none of them is acquired. This is quite absurd, of course:
Kant would have gladly admitted that we have the concepts
of space and time without learning them but, as Fodor says
[...] how could DOORKNOB be innate? DOOR-
KNOB, of all things!1
Fodor escapes this trap somehow, but this theory of
meaning has an even harder time explaining the deep differ-
ent in the creation of concepts between different languages.
Let us get rid immediately of the idea that “dog” means
DOG because of the three letters of which it is composed.
There is absolutely nothing in the sequence /d/, /o/, and /g/
that is in any way connected to dogness. The fact that I can
read it and understand that we are talking about a dog tells
something about me and the linguistic community in which
I function, but absolutely nothing about dogs or dogness.
If you don’s speak Italian, to you the sequence /c/, /a/, /n/,
and /e/ doesn’t mean anything, but to me it means the same
thing (with some important distinguos that I will consider
shortly). The idea that the three symbols /d/, /o/, and /g/ are
1ibid. p. 123, emphasis in the original.
somehow related to the concept dog is, indeed, quite naı¨ve,
and the fact that in ontology not only it is never openly de-
nied but, many times, it appears to be tacitly assumed as
obvious, doesn’t increase our confidence in the soundness
of the approach.
But if the letters themselves do not create any connection
between the symbol “dog” and the meaning of the word,
where does this connection come from? What is left of the
symbol once you take away the elements that constitute it?
Where does its identity lie? The only way one can save the
symbol is to say that its identity derives from its relations of
opposition with the other symbols of the system. Dog is dog
not because of the letters that make it up, but because they
allow us to distinguish it from dot, from hog, from god. We
are led, in other words, to a position that might oscillate be-
tween some form of cognitive functionalism [14] and struc-
tural semantics [4], depending on the degree to which we
want to rely on logic formulas in order to define meaning.
Both these positions, in spite of their fundamental differ-
ences, will agree that the meaning of a symbol is not in the
symbol itself, but in the whole system, and in the relation of
the symbols with the other symbols.
In mathematical terms, one could say that a system of
signification must be invariant to any isomorphic transfor-
mation of its terms: if we change dog in hog, hog in bog,
and so on, in such a way that the differences between sym-
bols are maintained, the ontology that we get must be ex-
actly equivalent to the original one. Of course, we, as En-
glish speaking people, will be completely unable to read it,
but here we are talking about algorithms, and they do not
care if we write dog or bog, as long as they can distinguish
one name from the other.
An isomorphism of this type will leave the relations be-
tween symbols unchanged so, if we take the second position
outlined above—namely that the relations are constitutive
of meaning—we obtain the necessary invariance. This po-
sition also entails that, whenever this relational invariance
is not in force, meaning is not preserved. In other words:
any transformations that is not an isomorphism of the terms
of an ontology will not preserve meaning. A good way to
test the plausibility of this assumption is to look at the re-
lations between different languages. Different languages
break the semantic field in different ways, and concepts
arise at the fissures of these divisions. Consider, for ex-
ample, the way in which adjectives of old age are consti-
tuted in Italian, Spanish and French2. The basic adjective,
vecchio/viejo/vieux is applied both to things and to persons.
There are specific forms, however: in Spanish, an˜ejo is an
appreciative form used mainly for liquors (un ron an˜ejo).
The Italian adjective anziano is applied mainly to people,
and the correspondence is roughly anziano/anciano/aˆge´,
but anziano has a broader meaning than the other two ad-
2This example is an extension of a similar one in [3].
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jectives, being used in expressions such as “il sergente
anziano” to denote seniority in a function, a situation in
which the Spanish would use antiguo and the French an-
cien. Note that Spanish also has the possibility of using
the word mayor as a softer and more respectful form of de-
noting a person of old age, while the corresponding Italian
and French words are never used in this sense. The corre-
spondence is, in other words, according to the schema that
follows. The differences are not just in the way different
languages divide the same semantic axes, but also in the
choice of semantic axes along which concepts are divided.
In English, for instance, the two most widely used words
that indicate moving bodies of sweet water are river and
stream, while in Italian they are fiume and affluente.
Italian Spanish French
an˜ejo
vecchio viejo vieux
anziano anciano aˆge´
mayor
antiguo ancien
antico antique
The semantic field in English is organized by size:
streams are smaller than rivers and have a more irregular
course. In Italian the semantic field is organized by destina-
tion: fiumi end up in the sea, while affluenti end up in other
rivers.
One could build many examples of this, and even bet-
ter ones if one considers languages that are culturally very
different, such as Chinese and French, or Urdu and Italian.
To the extent to which a functional translation from Chi-
nese to English, or fromHungarian to Quechua are possible,
then, we must admit that a meaning-preserving morphism is
not required to be an isomorphism of terms that preserves
relations3. Meaning, in other words, is a more abstract en-
tity than a mere structural correspondence: depending on
the global organization of the semantic field operated by a
language, one can introduce considerable structural distor-
tion and still end up with documents that “mean the same
thing”. Of course, this doesn’t mean that all transforma-
tions are admissible; to make a trivial example, our previ-
ous consideration on the constitutive nature of relations tell
us that, since a symbol is identified only by differentiation
with other symbols, one can’t have a signification system
composed of a single symbol: a morphism that maps all the
terms of a document or an ontology to a single one would
not only destroy the meaning of that document, it would de-
stroy the very idea of meaning even though, mathematically,
we are in the presence of a homomorphism.
3As a matter of fact, it is not required to be a function at all: the idea of
one correct translation has since long disappeared from translation theory
[9]. Rather, different translations are possible depending on the roˆle that
the translation will play in the receiving culture.
These example show or, at least, hint that terms and re-
lations are simply not enough to determine meaning. Both
the nature of the terms and of the relations can change quite
dramatically, and we still have signification systems that can
be considered roughly equivalent, at least to the extent that
it is possible to translate an Milorad Pavic novel, written in
Serbian, into English.
But is translation simply a linguistic problem? Language
differences are very relevant to the problem of signification,
and I believe that focusing on a single language one will
not be able to place the problem of encoding meaning in its
proper light. So, it might be useful to look at translation in
a little more depth. All modern theories of translation deny
that translation is simply, or even mainly, a linguistic fact. If
this were so, automatic translation would be relatively easy
while we know that, declarations of success notwithstand-
ing, it is an unsolved problem.
Eugene Nida, an American theorist considers translation
as an act of cultural replacement [10]. The work of a trans-
lator consists in studying the effect of a text in its original
culture and translate it into a text that will achieve the same
effect in the target culture. The emphasis for the translation
of meaning here is not much on the content of the original
linguistic expression, as much as on the effect that this ex-
pression has on the culture to which it is directed. In other
words, the meaning of a text can’t be separated from the act
of interpretation, an act that is always cultural and contex-
tual.
This orientation is even more pronounced in the succes-
sive developments of the theory of translation. The skopos
theory [15] emphasizes that the primary force behind trans-
lation is the function assigned to the translated text by the
translator, as an independent reader and interpreter of the
text. This theory incorporates the opinions of reception the-
ory of reading as a contextualized act in which meaning is
created. The translator, as a reader of the original text, trans-
lates not the text itself, but his own specific reading of the
text.
How is this relevant for ontology? Well, the transforma-
tion of a document into a formal text is a form of translation
and, if we follow the finding of translation theorists, it has
much less to do with a phantomatic inherent meaning of the
text than with the contextualized reading of whoever did the
encoding.
2.1 Ontology as non-contextual meaning
The perspective on meaning given by ontology is very
different from the contextual, interpretative process that
emerges from the previous considerations, and here lies, I
believe, its main limitation. This limitation goes beyond the
use of a specific logic system, and even beyond the limita-
tions of any conceivable logic system: it derives from the
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disregard of interpretation as a creator of meaning and, con-
sequently, to the idea that meaning is a thing rather than a
process. In order for ontology to work, it is necessary that
meaning be a property of a document, something that can
be reified, formalized, and attached as a property to a docu-
ment.
I have already argued that I see the idea of formalizing
meaning in a set of symbols and relations between them as
highly problematic, but I want to make you notice how the
observations that we are about to make will lead us even
further: the very idea that the meaning of a document is
in the document, that it can somehow be attached to the
document in such a way that it can be revealed to a un-
contextualized reading, is quite wrong. But let us proceed
in an orderly fashion.
An ontology encodes an absolute and immutable mean-
ing of a text4. Where does it come from? For such an hy-
pothesis to work, meaning must exist prior to text and in-
dependently of the language in which it is expressed. The
scheme is pretty much that of a communication channel.
- - -
6 6
meaning
encode decode
meaninglanguage
noise noise
The origin of the communicative act is a meaning that re-
sides with the author, and that the author wishes to ex-
press in a permanent text. This meaning is a-historical, im-
mutable, and pre-linguistic. In order to communicate mean-
ing, the author translates it into the shared code of language,
and sends it to the receiver. This translation may be imper-
fect, as indicated by the “noise” arrow entering the trans-
lation box; a contingency due to the accidental imperfec-
tions of human languages. A perfect language (ontology
acknowledges that this might be an unattainable theoretical
limit) would be the perfect mirror of the essential mean-
ing as it appears in the mind of the author and would allow
a perfect translation. Once meaning is translated into lan-
guage, it can be delivered to the reader, who can then pro-
ceed to decode it (possibly with the insertion of some more
noise) obtaining a reasonable approximation of the original
meaning as intended by the author.
This model of signification is necessary for the ontologi-
cal enterprise because it is the only one that allows meaning
to be assigned to a text, and recorded in a formal language
other than the natural language, from which it can be ex-
tracted through automatic means following a schema like
this (I have omitted the noise for the sake of simplicity):
4This doesn’t exclude the possibility that different encodings may give
different, possibly conflicting, accounts of the meaning of a document,
among which it may be necessary to negotiate. But every encoding will
give one account of meaning, in absolute terms, that is, independently of
the circumstances of interpretation.
- - -meaning encode decode
meaninglanguage
- - -formula algor.
meaningformal system
The conclusions of much of the linguistics and philos-
ophy of language of the XX century, however, point in a
different direction. There can be no meaning before lan-
guage and independent of it: meaning can only exist within
the categories and the strictures of language [5]. Not only
meaning, but the signifying subject as well are a product of
language [8]. There can be no pre-linguistic signification
experience that belongs only to the author, because mean-
ing can only be expressed in language, and language is a
social instrument.
It is the act of reading, contextual and situated, that gives
a text its meaning. The reader plays an active roˆle in this
meaning-creating activity: reading is not a one-directional
activity in which a reader is imbued with meaning; it is a
dynamic two-way process. It is an infinite process through
which a frame of reference is created in which part of the
text is interpreted, a text that changes the frame of refer-
ence and leads to a different interpretation of the text, which
changes the frame of reference and so on... This process of
framing and interpretation is what reception theorists call
the hermeneutic circle [2, 1].
Lest should you think that all this applies only to liter-
ature and not to the prosaic world in which ontology oper-
ates, let me take the most prosaic example I can think of:
a sign on a door that says “trespassers will be prosecuted.”
The hermeneutical activity necessary to understand this sign
is considerable. I must understand, for instance, that this
sign is not informative in the sense that a newspaper head-
line is: I am not being informed that there have been tres-
passers somewhere and that they will be prosecuted some-
time in the future: in western societies at least, information
of this kind is not written on signs hanging from doors, es-
pecially if the sign is made of plastic or wood (and therefore
is durable) and the writing is not dated. Such a sign typi-
cally is a prohibition, a threat; the word “trespasser” refers
to me (the reader) in case I decide to walk through the door,
and it threatens me of prosecution if I do so. The threat also
implies that prosecution is likely to result in punishment. I
must understand that trespassing in this context means to
cross this door, not some door in the palace of the king of
Siam. I have to have a general knowledge of private prop-
erty to understand that preventing people from entering a
building is one of the rights that society grants to propri-
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etors (while, for instance, preventing people from looking
at the building is in general not such a right), that there are
authorities that will guarantee the respect of these rights,
that they will punish people who infringe these rights, that
the sign has been placed there with their tacit approval, and
so on...
None of these elements, necessary for the interpretation
of the sign, is in the text: they must be supplied by a spe-
cific situation. The text here takes meaning by being situ-
ated (viz. placed in a situation: a door on a building rather
than, say, a shelf on a store that sells signs, a situation in
which the text would have a completely different meaning)
and in a certain relation with other texts that are not present,
namely the political discourse that regulate private property,
the speech through which certain customs have been im-
planted in the reader, and so on. Finally, all this linguistic
discourse and all this hermeneutuc activity rest on a sub-
stratum of human practices and action: the political relation
of power between authority and citizens, and the fact that in
order to understand punishment one must understand pain
(psychological pain, at least).
But if the meaning of a text depends so crucially on the
context in which it is read, then the general plan of ontol-
ogy, to attach meaning to a text so that a simple algorithm
can decode is in quite a bit of trouble. It should be stressed
again that the limitations of ontology that we have high-
lighted are not a limitation of the particular logic that one
might use to implement an ontology, nor of logic per se:
the limitations are at a much more fundamental level. The
discussion in this section problematizes the very possibility
of representing meaning as an attribute of a text. According
to this view, meaning is not in the text: a text is merely the
boundary condition of a process that depends on the inter-
preter, his context, the linguistic community of which the
interpreter is part, its discursive practices, etc. This doesn’t
necessarily imply that, for the purpose of meaning forma-
tion, the text can’t be usefully represented using alternative
means, including formal ones. As computing scientists, we
are interested, pragmatically, in situations in which reading
and interpretation are somehow mediated by a computer,
and alternative representations of the text may favor this
mediation. What can’t in any case be assumed is that rep-
resentation is a representation of the meaning of the text, a
representation from which meaning can be extracted in an
a-contextual way by an algorithm.
3 Context-based retrieval
In the light of the previous observations, it seems clear
that one can’t hope to simply encode the semantics of a doc-
ument in manner independent of the act of access: meaning
is created anew with each data access, and it is a result of
that operation. Just like the tree falling in a deserted for-
est that makes no noise (although it does provoke acoustic
waves), so a text, when it is not accessed, has no meaning
(although it has the potential for signification). Our prob-
lems, then, are basically three: given a data access situation,
we must (i) find a suitable context in which the data access
is situated, (ii) find ways to formalize this context, at least to
a certain degree (we are, after all, computing scientist, and
we can only work with what we can formalize), and (iii)
find ways in which the context can interact with the data to
generate meaning.
Let us start with a fairly general theoretical model. We
have said that the context in which a document is interpreted
is essential to determine its meaning, that is, that the con-
text changes the meaning of a text. We can also see things
going in the opposite direction: the function of the seman-
tics of a text is to change the context of the reader. If you
are interested in novel, the context in which you look at
American literature will not be the same after readingMoby
Dick; if you travel on the London subway, your context will
no longer be the same after you read that “dogs must be
carried at all times”. A document that doesn’t change the
context in which you act is, by definition, meaningless. We
can express this situation with the following expression:
C1
µ(t)−→ C2
where C1 and C2 are the contexts of the reader before and
after interpreting the text, t is the text, and µ(t) is its mean-
ing.
This is, as I have said, a very generic model, but we can
use to start answering some questions. For one thing, is it
possible to formalize meaning? The answer of our model
is that it is possible only to the extent that it is possible to
formalize context. If C1 and C2 are formally defined in
mathematical terms, then, and only then, it will be possible
to give a formal definition of the function µ(t).
At one extremum, we have the situation in which the
context can be completely formalized. This is the case, for
instance, in programming languages: here the context can
be reduced to the state of a computer on which the program
is run. The meaning of a program, from our point of view, is
a function that transforms an initial state of the computer to
a final one. In other words, if the text is a program and the
context of its interpretation is a computer system, meaning
reduces to the usual denotational semantics of a program.
At the other extremumwe have the general semiotic con-
text, which we know can’t be formalized completely in
symbols, that is, given that a computer is a symbol ma-
nipulation machine, it can’t be formalized in a computer.
Again, this doesn’t entail that any attempt to use a computer
(which, because of the characteristics of the device, requires
a formalization of the context) is useless, but it does imply
that no computing system can be semantically complete, so
to speak, and that each computer system will require user
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interaction to contextualize access and allow signification
to happen.
The properties of the “space of contexts” depend cru-
cially on the properties of the representation of the context
that we have chosen, and it is therefore difficult to say some-
thing more about meaning is we don’t impose some addi-
tional restriction. A reasonable one seems to be that we be
capable of measuring the degree by which two contexts dif-
fer by means of an operation ∆(C1, C2) ≥ 0 such that, for
each context C, it is ∆(C,C) = 0. We don’t require, for
the time being, that ∆ be a distance. Now the meaning of a
document d in a context C can be defined as the difference
that d causes to C:
µC(d) = ∆(µ(d)(C), C) (1)
Within this theoretical framework we can analyze, at
least in the first approximation, various existing approaches,
and devise ways to extend them. In this general scheme, the
ontological approach to meaning can be synthesized as a
constant function:
⊥ µ(d) // C (2)
that is, ontology assigns a meaning to a document indepen-
dently of the context in which the document is interpreted.
This fact results, in our model, in the creation of a constant
context, which depends only on the document and not on
what was there before.
A very different point of view is that of emergent seman-
tics [13, 12]: in this approach, a highly interactive system
allows the user and the system to organize the data in a way
that highlights their contextual relations. The meaning of
the data emerges as an epiphenomenon of this interaction.
Emergent semantics does not work with one document at
the time, but always with set of documents, since mean-
ing always emerges from relations. Therefore, the meaning
function µ will take as argument a suitable configurationD
of documents. The user action is represented as an operator
u, and the schema is the following:
C
µ(D)
**
C ′
u
jj (3)
The context oscillates between C, which is the new contex-
tual situation in which the user wants to end, and C ′, which
is the context proposed by the computer with the access to
the new documents. The semantic function is, in this case,
the equilibrium of that cycle or, in other terms, the fix-point
of the function µ(D) ◦ u.
Our next problem is how to capture ongoing activities,
how to represent them and, for what is possible, formalize
them, in such a way that they can be used as a basis for
data access. In general, of course, this is impossible. If a
person is, say, shopping for detergent and wants to search
the internet for brands with certain characteristics, there is
very little hope that we can represent the activity “shopping
for detergent” in a computer system: we are in this case
in the presence of a physical activity that leaves no digital
trace, so to speak.
On the other hand, a significant number of daily activ-
ities are, for many of us, executed on or with the aid of a
computer. In this case, they do leave a digital trace, one that
can be recorded and used as a context for a search carried
out as part of that activity. Suppose I am preparing a presen-
tation for a conference to which I had submitted a paper and
that, during this process, I need to clarify a point or to look
for an illustration for my presentation. In order to prepare
my presentation, I have created a document in a directory
(let us say the directory presentation) where I have possibly
copied some documents that I thought might be useful. This
directory is likely to be placed in a hierarchy, something like
this:
work
 



##F
FF
FF
FF
F
admin publications
||xx
xx
xx
xx
((QQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQQ
QQ
journals





!!D
DD
DD
DD
DD
D

conferences
 9
99
99
99
9
...
...
... iccs
8
88
88
88
88
 




...
paper presentation ...
Its sibling directories will contain documents somehow
related to the topic at hand although, probably, not so di-
rectly as those that can be found in the work directory. The
siblings of the conference directory (and their descendants)
will contain documents related to my general area of activ-
ity, although not necessarily directly related to the topic of
the presentation. This project, in its context search com-
ponent, will look for ways to use this information in order
to direct and focus the search. This information will con-
stitute the context of the search. One consequence of this
point of view is important enough to be noted from the out-
set: data access is no longer an independent activity, but can
take place only in the context of a certain activity.
3.1 Context representation
The problem of representing context and, most impor-
tantly, how to make it interact with the documents, are still
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largely unexplored, at least as far as computing science
goes, and it is not clear in which direction one should look
for a proper representation of context.
As a first step, one might consider the use of techniques
from information retrieval. Here, I will give some pointers
on the possible use of a model based on a vector space repre-
sentation of word contexts [6], and a self-organizing map to
give a non-linear form of latent semantics. This is the model
that we are currently using in our activity. Word context are
groups of sequential words that occur in a text. In this case,
they are more representative than single words because they
capture, statistically, word co-occurrence, which is a strong
indicator of the semantics in which a word is used in a given
context (if the word “bank” co-occurs with “investment”,
it is likely to mean a financial institution, if it co-occurs
with the word “river”, it is likely to indicate the border of
a body of running water, and so on). These co-occurrences
will be represented in a suitable feature space and a Self-
Organizing Map [7] will be used to cluster and represent its
contents, using again fairly standard techniques. As a start-
ing point for the representation of context, a self-organizing
map appears to be a suitable choice for a number of reasons.
i) The map represents a sort of non-linear latent semantic
subspace: it capture the statistically significant rela-
tions between terms in a given context.
ii) The learning algorithm gives us an obvious way to
start including the structure of the directories into
the context representation: learning may not be lim-
ited to the documents contained in the working di-
rectory, but can include those contained in the chil-
dren/siblings/parents. Moreover, by varying the frac-
tion of times the documents in each one of these direc-
tories are presented we can give more or less impor-
tance to certain structural relations.
iii) The map can constitute a query formalism. Given that
the map represents the context, we can create a query
by modifying it (i.e. distorting it) towards certain terms
using Kohonen’s training algorithm. In the previous
case, the word “bank” would pull the part of the map
closer to it towards it, and that part of the map would
contain the context in which the word appears. The
difference between the initial map and the deformed
one is the meaning of the text that we are after. We are
studying efficient ways to express this difference as a
query.
iv) The map, being geometric in nature, suggests a way to
extend the context representation to multi-media docu-
ment or, at least, to documents containing images. We
can extract image features that can be represented in
geometric spaces [11] and derive the direct sum of the
space of words and the space of features. This should
allow the map to capture any statistical regularity, in
the document corpus, between certain word combina-
tions and certain image features. Note that if the fea-
tures are extracted from regions of the image, one can
use feature context techniques similar to the word con-
text used for text, thus seeking statistical regularities
between co-occurrences of words, and co-occurrences
of localized features.
While the techniques used in this approach are fairly
standard, its novelty is that, in this case, we are not using
them in order to represent the data base in which the search
is to be done, but to represent the environment from which
the query originates. Note however, that point iii) and iv)
above (the algorithm for the context distortion and that to
translate the context difference into a query, and the de-
ployment of the map in a multi-feature space, to seek statis-
tical regularities between co-occurrences of words and co-
occurrences of features) represent significant new technical
challenges.
4 Words of parting
I have argued that formal annotation, and the general on-
tological programme that comes with it, might not be the
proper way to consider the problem of the meaning of the
data and, in general, to frame the issues related to seman-
tics. This is not, I suspect, a popular position, and there are
a few reasons that contribute to its unpopularity and to the
exclusivity of the attention given to annotation and ontol-
ogy.
First, there is the pull of certain common sense philos-
ophy. We can look at texts, read them, and make sense of
them, and it seems natural to interpret this act as unlocking
the meaning that is in the text. After all, if I don’t know from
what gate does flight 354 to New York leave, and I read the
announcement board of the airport, I end up knowing it. It
is easy to model this situation as a transfer of a specific in-
formation (viz. that the flight leaves from gate C34) from
the announcement board to me. The error is the failure to
recognize that this is a limit case, namely a case in which
the external context is so constraining that the readong of
the symbol “C34” can basically have only an interpretation,
and to extend the same model to the common situation, the
one in which the interpretation context plays a much more
important roˆle. I have given my arguments (convincing, I
hope) why I believe that this position represents a gross
philosophical simplification, and I believe that it will ulti-
mately result in the sterility of semantic computing.
Second, there is the normal inertia of the established po-
sition upon which truckloads of money have already been
invested. The agencies and companies that have invested in
annotation and ontology are understandably nervous when
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they hear that they might have bet on the wrong horse. But,
of course, if they have indeed bet on the wrong horse (and I
believe they have), the sooner they know, the better.
Finally, there is a point related to the economy of the
commercial web (which, unlike ten years ago, regrettably
represents the vast majority of the web today). The model
of meaning assumed by the semantic web is very appealing
to web companies because, if meaning is inherent in a text,
it can be owned, bought, and sold. In the ontology view,
meaning is a property of the author (or of the organizations
that bought it from the author), a property that can be ex-
changed with the reader using the currency of language.
This “market” view of meaning open disturbing (or inter-
esting, depending on what side you are looking at them)
possibilities of copyrighting meaning, patenting meaning,
and in general posing commercial restrictions to the free
exchange of meaning. We have seen in the last few years
the desperate (and, so far, successful) attempts of the indus-
try to restrict all available intellectual property laws. The
ontological model of meaning gives them a whole new area
in which copyright can be enforced. For those of us who
believe that the web should be a common good, in which
commercial interests should never replace the free exchange
of ideas, this is not an appealing perspective.
Technically, this paper has presented the outline of a dif-
ferent model of meaning, one in which the reader’s context
plays a preponderant roˆle. I have presented a simple frame-
work in which we are currently experimenting with this
model, a framework that in the future will be extended in
different directions: on the one hand, the integration in this
framework of more formal representations, at least for those
parts of the context that can be formalized; on the other
hand, the development of suitable data base techniques to
make this kind of query efficient. Our purpose will be, on
one hand, to build a context-based data access client (con-
figured as a plug-in to some word processing or presenta-
tion program, if possible) to make context based retrieval on
general web sites and repositories and, on the other hand,
to build a context-based access server. The latter will be
akin to the servers built for search engines such as yahoo
or google but, while these servers do not coo¨perate with
the user’s computer (apart from the elementary communica-
tion necessary to retrieve the query and return the results),
the server that we consider here will be integrated with the
user’s computer from which it will derive the current con-
text, and with which it will coo¨perate to support interaction.
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